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We introduce concepts and measures relating to inequality between identity groups. We 
define and discuss the concepts of Representational Inequality, Sequence Inequality and 
Group Inequality Comparison. Representational Inequality captures the extent to which 
an attribute is shared between members of distinct groups. Sequence Inequality captures 
the extent to which groups are ordered hierarchically. Group Inequality Comparison 
captures the extent of differences between groups-. The concepts have application in 
interpreting segregation, clustering and polarization in societies. There exists a mapping 
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"Civil paths to peace also demand the removal of gross economic inequalities, social 
humiliations and political disenfranchisement, which can contribute to generating 
confrontation and hostility. Purely economic measures of inequality do not bring out the 
social dimension of the inequality involved. For example, when the people in the bottom 
groups in terms of income have different non-economic characteristics, in terms of race 
(such as being black rather than white), or immigration status (such as being recent 
arrivals rather than older residents), then the significance of the economic inequality is 
substantially magnified by its "coupling" with other divisions, linked with non-economic 
identity groups." 
 





Do differences in the economic and social achievements of distinct groups merit 
attention? Sen’s remarks above suggest that the salience of interpersonal differences in 
welfare can be increased when these are correlated with certain other differences among 
individuals. Such a conclusion can be justified from at least two perspectives.  First, 
inter-group differences may possess an intrinsic significance from the standpoint of 
assessments of justice and fairness in the distribution of goods and opportunities.2 
Second, the fact that there exist distinct groups in society and that these groups exhibit 
inter-group differences may have instrumental significance from the standpoint of their 
impact on social goods such as peace, stability or economic growth.   
 
The concern with the intrinsic significance of inter-group differences has centered on the 
degree to which ‘morally irrelevant’ characteristics of a person (such as belonging to a 
given race, sex, caste or other group as a result of birth) should be permitted to determine 
her or his life chances3. Such a motivation is distinct from one based on the idea that 
social goods or ‘bads’ may be generated by inter-group differences in economic and 
social achievements, and that inter-group differences may be relevant for that reason. A 
long standing body of literature in economics and other social sciences has empirically 
explored this instrumental concern.4 Both concerns have led to the development of a 
growing literature which has identified and empirically examined such concepts as 
‘horizontal inequality’, segregation, polarization and related ideas about differences 
between groups.  
 
                                                 
2 See Appendix One for a brief discussion. 
3 For a review of these debates, see e.g. Roemer (1996) and Sen (1992).  Arguments  that societies should 
be organized so as to limit the consequences of the “brute luck” of being born into a particular position 
include those of “luck egalitarians” such as Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Dworkin (2000), Rawls (1971) 
and  Roemer (1996). Egalitarians of other kinds may come to similar conclusions for different reasons (see 
e.g. Anderson (1999)).    
4 For some recent examples see e.g.  Stewart (2001), Alesina et al (2003), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 
2002), Montalvo and Reynal Querol (2005), Miguel and Gugerty (2005) and Østby (2008). 
 2
That a multitude of concepts concerning inter-group difference has been proposed is not 
entirely surprising in light of the fact that such differences can be understood as occurring 
in more than one way. For example, studies on segregation focus on the degree to which 
members of different groups share a location, occupation or other attribute while studies 
on horizontal inequality focus on the extent of difference in the income or other 
achievements of separate groups. In both cases however, the subject of interest is the 
degree of unevenness or inequality in the possession of attributes between groups.  The 
goal of our paper is to elucidate some distinct ways in which inter-group differences can 
be conceived, which encompass but are not restricted to the concerns of these existing 
approaches.  
 
A common underlying concern in analyses of inter-group differences is the degree to 
which distinct groups are systematically over-or under-represented in their possession of 
various attributes (levels of income or health, club membership or political office etc.).  
In this paper we introduce the concept of Representational Inequality (RI) as a way to 
capture this concern. This concept describes the extent to which a given attribute (for 
instance, a level of income or health, or right or left handedness) is shared by members of 
distinct groups. It can be used to measure the degree of ‘segregation’ of distinct identity 
groups in the attribute space.5   
  
When individuals can be ordinally ranked in relation to an attribute (such as income or 
health but not right or left handedness) we may be interested not only in how segregated 
or separated each identity group is in terms of their achievements, but in some measure of 
their relative positions in the ranking. Sequence Inequality (SI), understood as the degree 
to which members of one group are placed higher in a given hierarchy than those from 
another, captures this concern. Such a concept provides an intuitive framework for 
understanding the degree of ‘clustering’ of various identity groups in distinct sections of 
a hierarchy.6 
 
When individuals’ level of achievement can also be cardinally identified for an attribute 
(as for income but not for right or left handedness) the distance between groups’ attribute 
levels may be of interest.  We may identify a distinction between two different concepts, 
which we term respectively Group Inequality Comparison (I) and Group Inequality 
Comparison (II) and abbreviate as GIC (I) and GIC (II).  The concept of Group 
Inequality Comparison (I) involves a comparison of counterfactuals.  Specifically, it is 
derived by comparing the inequality arising in a society in which all of the members of a 
group are assigned a representative income for that group and the total interpersonal 
inequality in a society. This concept is concerned with identifying the extent to which 
between-group inequality ‘accounts for’ overall inequality in society. Group Inequality 
Comparison (II) by contrast measures only the inequality arising in the first situation, i.e. 
                                                 
5 Segregation is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, inter alia, as “The separation of a portion of 
portions of a collective or complex unity from the rest; the isolation of particular constituents of a 
compound or mixture”.  
6 A cluster is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as, inter alia, “A collection of things of the same 
kind…growing closely together; a bunch… a number of persons, animals, or things gathered or situated 
close together; an assemblage, group, swarm, crowd.” 
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that in a society in which all of the members of a group are assigned a representative 
income for that group. This latter concept is concerned with the absolute magnitude of 
the inequality generated by between-group inequality.  
 
We show that combining these concepts can provide the basis of an understanding of 
conjoint concepts of group differences such as ‘polarization’.7  The concepts we identify 
can be fruitfully combined to measure polarization, understood to involve the collection 
of like elements and the separation of such collections of like elements from one another.  
The combination of Representational Inequality with Sequence Inequality alone provides 
a measure of what might be termed ‘Ordinal Polarization’ Combining Group Inequality 
Comparison (of either type I or type II) with these other two indices can provide a richer 
index of Polarization applicable to the case in which the attribute is cardinally measurable 
as well. 
 
The concept of polarization that we employ here is distinct from that developed in the 
preponderance of the existing literature in that it draws on information about the identity 
groups to which those who possess distinct attributes belong. In contrast, the existing 
frameworks generally employ a ‘collapsed’ framework in which the level of the attribute 
(typically income) defines the identity group (Esteban and Ray (1994), Duclos, Esteban 
and Ray (2004)). In these frameworks, polarization of an income distribution is 
understood to involve ‘identification’ between individuals possessing a certain level of 
income and ‘alienation’ between those individuals and others possessing different 
incomes. In our framework, in contrast, polarization of an income distribution is 
understood to involve segregation of individuals belonging to distinct identity groups at 
certain levels of income and the separation of these groupings of individuals in the 




Part I: Concepts of Group Inequality  
 
 
One approach to evaluating inter-group differences is to construct a measure of overall 
group advantage or disadvantage for each group prior to assessing the differences in these 
overall measures.8  Although there can be advantages to such an approach, it can obscure 
the diverse aspects of inter-group difference (by reducing inter-group differences to 
inequalities in a single dimension).  We accordingly explicitly identify here three distinct 




We define a situation of representational inequality as occurring when, for some attribute 
and some identity group, the proportion of the group possessing the attribute is either 
                                                 
7 The Oxford English Dictionary defines the verb “polarize” as “To accentuate a division within (a group, 
system, etc.); to separate into two (or occas. several) opposing groups, extremes of opinion, etc.”  
8 See Jayaraj and Subramanian (2006) for an example of such an approach. 
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greater or less than the proportion of the group in the overall population.  To provide 
some graphical intuition for this idea, consider the distribution of income among different 
groups in a society that consists of fifty percent whites and fifty percent blacks. Figure 1 
depicts the situation in which there is no representational inequality. The location of each 
bar on the horizontal axis represents an income level ordered from lowest to highest and 
the proportion of persons possessing that income of either group is represented through 
shading. At all levels of income, blacks and whites are represented in equal proportion to 
their share of the population as a whole (i.e. one half each).  Any deviation from such 
equi-proportionality leads to a situation of representational inequality.  Such a situation is 
depicted in Figure 2, in which at certain levels of income blacks or whites comprise a 
larger or smaller proportion of the individuals possessing that level of income than they 
do in the population as a whole. 
 
While the situation depicted in Figure 2 is one of representational inequality, both groups 
are represented at all the incomes. In contrast, Figure 3 depicts a situation in which at 
each level of income there is complete segregation, in the sense that at each level of 
income there is one and only one identity group represented. It may be noted that 
although this is a situation of complete segregation the incomes at which whites and 
blacks appear are evenly interspersed. We depict this example in order to make sharp the 
distinction between segregation and clustering as we use the terms. The former refers to a 
situation in which those possessing a specific attribute (in this case an income level) 
belong disproportionately to a particular group. The latter refers to a situation in which 
the attributes disproportionately possessed by members of a particular group are grouped 
together in a certain part of an attribute hierarchy (in this case the income spectrum). 
 
The concept of representational inequality clearly need not be restricted to a scenario in 
which the attribute is cardinally orderable. Thus, for example, we can apply the principle 
in an equally straightforward manner to unordered attributes such as location of 
residence, or membership in distinct clubs or legislatures.  If instead of income brackets, 
each bar referred to a distinct legislature in a federal country, the figures we have 





The distinction between ‘complete segregation’ and ‘complete clustering’ can be seen by 
comparing Figure 3 and Figure 4. Figure 4 depicts the situation that results from a 
transfer of incomes such that all the whites move to the richer half of society while all the 
blacks move to the poorer half of society. This situation is one in which each sub-group is 
concentrated in a different part of the income distribution. Such a situation can plausibly 
be described as one of ‘complete clustering’ of groups.  In both cases, there is complete 
segregation and thus maximal representational inequality. However, in Figure 3, whether 
an individual is black or white provides very little information on his or her rank in 
society. By contrast, in Figure 4, whether an individual is black or white provides a great 
deal of information. One simple way to capture the distinction between Figure 3 and 
Figure 4 is through the concept of sequence inequality, which together with 
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representational inequality captures the clustering of the income distribution.  This 
concept is linked to the position in the overall societal ranking possessed by individuals 
belonging to distinct groups in the hierarchy. 
 
An individual (weakly) rank-dominates another if that individual is ranked equal to or 
higher than the other in the possession of the attribute. For any population partitioned into 
given identity groups, there are a fixed number of between-group pair-wise comparisons 
between individuals from different identity groups. The share of the total number of such 
between group pair-wise comparisons involving a given group in which a member of the 
group rank-dominates a member of some other group is called its level of group rank 
dominance. Group rank dominance is an indicator of the position the group occupies in 
the ordinal hierarchy of attribute levels.  Another way to understand the difference 
between Figure 3 and Figure 4 is simply that the average rank of the whites and the 
blacks is different.  This is clearly a necessary condition for distinct groups to be 
clustered in different parts of the attribute space. We establish in Appendix Two that a 
monotonic relationship exists between the concepts of group rank dominance and of 
average rank.   Both of these could be seen to be indicators of the placement of groups in 
the attribute hierarchy (in the extreme complete clustering of groups) and will thus be 
referred to as indicators of a group’s rank sequence position. 
 
The level of inequality in different groups’ rank sequence position (whether as measured 
by group rank dominance or by average rank) indicates the extent to which a population 
is clustered. We refer to this concept of inequality as sequence inequality (SI).  Some 
reflection will suffice to show that this is an unambiguous criterion even when group 
sizes differ. In any situation sequence inequality is minimal when the groups are evenly 
interspersed or symmetrically placed around the median member(s). 
 
It is clear from this discussion that while Figure 3 and Figure 4 depict two groups with 
equal representational inequality, the two groups possess different levels of group rank 
dominance and average rank. In Figure 4, whites have 100% of the available instances of 
rank domination and higher average rank.  
 
While sequence inequality and representational inequality are related, they are also 
distinct concepts. A simple example which makes this distinction transparent is provided 
in Figures 5 and 6. In Figure 5, both groups possess the same level of group rank 
dominance and average rank. The black group has two of the possible four instances of 
rank domination as does the white group, and their average rank is the same. Thus there 
is no sequence inequality between the groups.  In the second, both groups again share 
equally in levels of group rank domination (both have two of the potential four instances 
once again) and have the same average rank.  The situation once again is one in which 
there is no sequence inequality.  However, in the first case there is complete 
representational inequality and in the second case there is zero representational 
inequality. In neither case is group membership always associated with higher rank, yet 





Group Inequality Comparison 
 
Figure 4 depicts a situation of maximal representational inequality and maximal sequence 
inequality.  It could perhaps be thought of as a situation of polarization in the sense that 
each group is concentrated at a given pole of the income distribution. However, this is 
true only in an ordinal sense.  Both the situations depicted in Figure 4 and in Figure 7 are 
identical from the standpoints of representational inequality and sequence inequality 
since neither concept takes note of cardinal information, which alone accounts for the 
difference between the two situations described. To take account of cardinal information 
(for instance, concerning the distance between distinct clusters), it is necessary to 
introduce an additional concept. 
 
A common way to account for such information is to take note of the distance between 
the means of distinct sub-populations, for example by using measures of inequality 
between group means. This, indeed is the conception behind Group Inequality 
Comparison (II). However such an approach ignores relevant information on within 
group inequality.  Consider a two-group society in which all members of each group 
originally respectively possess the mean incomes of their groups. Suppose that both 
groups experience within-group transfers leading to intra-group inequality.  The extent of 
inequality in the society must be judged to have increased if the measure of inequality 
employed obeys the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle (ensuring that such transfers 
between persons are deemed to increase overall inequality).  However, between-group 
inequality (understood in terms of inequality between mean incomes of groups) is 
unchanged.  Between-group inequality must be deemed to have become relatively less 
substantial in comparison with total interpersonal inequality.   
 
An approach to inter-group inequalities which is based on between-group inequalities in 
isolation rather than on the contribution of between-group inequality to overall inter-
personal inequality (i.e. Group Inequality Comparison (II)) will fail to contrast situations 
that might be distinguished.    Consider Figure 8 which depicts a two group society in 
which all members of each group originally possess mean income A and B respectively.  
Both groups now experience within-group transfers which increase inequality and their 
distributions are now depicted by densities A’ and B’ respectively.  Assume further that 
the transfers are such that the span between the means is Δ and the span between the 
richest and poorest members of each group is also Δ. We might plausibly consider inter-
group differences to have become less significant after the transfer since no member of 
the richer group is further away from some member of the poorer group than before the 
transfer, and all but the very richest member of the richer group is closer to some member 
of the poorer group.   
 
On the other hand,  Group Inequality Comparison (I) can have the disadvantage of 
ignoring information relevant for understanding the extent to which inter-group 
differences generate overall inequality. To see this, consider what would happen if in 
Figure 8, the original populations A and B were made arbitrarily closer to each other 
while maintaining their separation. According to Group Inequality Comparison (I), there 
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would be no difference between the two situations. If we employed instead the concept of 
Group Inequality Comparison (I) the degree to which between group differences generate 
inequality will have fallen.  It can be seen that there are potentially good reasons to 
choose wither approach.  
 
Group Inequality Comparison need not be measured, of course, in terms of differences in 
means and could potentially be understood in other ways -- for instance in terms of 
differences in medians, generalized means, or other measures of central tendency.  
Indeed, still other ways of viewing group differences can be envisioned, for example 
involving comparison of higher moments of the group-specific distributions of incomes, 
examination of the extent of ‘non-overlap’ between distributions etc. For a wide-ranging 
discussion of methods of defining group separation, see Anderson (2004, 2005).  We 
limit our further discussions of the concept however to the case where it is measuring 
mean differences, for expositional simplicity.   
 
 
Combining Concepts: Polarization 
 
We have introduced above three concepts relating to inter-group inequalities: 
representational inequality, sequence inequality and group inequality comparison.    How 
are these concepts related to polarization? Polarization is a concept which has been used 
in many different ways in the literature, for example, to mean the absence of ‘middleness’ 
in a distribution (Wolfson, 1994), the distance between the average achievements of 
groups (Østby, 2008) and the presence of distinct sizable groupings in the income 
distribution (Esteban and Ray, 1994).  Many of these approaches do not explicitly rely on 
the identification of individuals by identity groups (understood as being distinct from 
attributes).  A contrasting approach understands the level of polarization of a distribution 
in terms of the extent of inter-group differences in the possession of an attribute.  If 
polarization is defined in this way, it becomes clear that each one of the concepts of inter-
group inequality defined above is itself a measure of polarization. However, taken 
individually each may prove to be an unsatisfactory measure of polarization, because of 
the information to which each is individually indifferent.  Thus the relative ranking of the 
situations depicted in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 7 according to the extent of 
polarization depends on the expansiveness of the approach used.  In particular, all the 
figures depict maximal polarization as judged according to RI, whereas Figures 4 and 7 
depict maximal polarization according to both RI and SI, and Figure 7 depicts a higher 
degree of polarization than does Figure 4 according to GIC (taking the figures to possess 
the same income scale on the horizontal axis).    
 
The fact that our judgments regarding the polarization of society may depend on more 
than one concept suggests the value of combining measures of inter-group differences to 
construct orderings of social situations according to the extent of their polarization.  Such 
orderings can be partial and based on dominance of the vectors (2-tuples or 3-tuples) 
defined by the individual measures of inter-group differences, or can be complete if based 
on some method of aggregation of these measures.    
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This said, orderings based on combining only a pair of the concepts we have defined (and 
not all three) will be indifferent to some important considerations that may be deemed 
relevant in any assessment of polarization. We have already seen that in the two group 
case, combining representational inequality and sequence inequality will be sufficient to 
give us a measure of ordinal polarization. Such a combination however will be indifferent 
to cardinality and will be unable to distinguish, for example, between the situations 
depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 8 respectively. 
 
A measure combining sequence inequality and group inequality comparison is not 
indifferent to cardinal information on the achievements of individuals but it is indifferent 
to the degree of clustering of identity groups in any specific income bracket. In order to 
see this, consider Figures 5 and 6 again. Let us assume that, by construction, the mean 
income of both blacks and whites is the same in both groups in both situations. If this is 
the case, the index of group inequality comparison is the same in both figures (i.e. zero) 
and sequence inequality is the same, but representational inequality is different. We may 
argue that in Figure 5 there is no clustering of identity groups in distinct parts of the 
income spectrum, as there is no representational inequality. In Figure 6, however, blacks 
are clustered at the top and bottom ends of the income spectrum, and indeed there is 
complete segregation between the two groups. Note further that we could increase the 
distance between the blacks at the ends and the whites in the middle, keeping the means 
of both groups the same (so that the blacks at each end are very distant from the whites at 
the center) and yet record the same level of polarization defined according to such a 
measure. 
 
Finally, combining representational inequality and group inequality comparison (I) alone 
leads to an approach that is indifferent to the sequencing of individuals from distinct 
identity groups in the income spectrum. Consider the distinction between Figure 9a and 
Figure 9b.  Both depict cases of complete segregation. However in Figure 9b, some 
population of blacks has been moved to a higher income than all of the whites, thereby 
increasing within group inequality for the blacks and total inter-personal inequality.  We 
can further imagine that every white has been given a higher income in such a way that 
within-group inequality among whites is unchanged and the ratio of between-group 
inequality to total inequality (which would otherwise have fallen) is restored to its level 
prior to the initial movement of blacks.  In other words, the index of group inequality 
comparison (I)remains the same by construction, as does representational inequality.  
However, the sequencing of blacks and whites in the income distribution (and thus 
sequence inequality) is different.  An analogous argument can be made for group 
inequality comparison (II) by moving the blacks and whites so as to keep mean incomes 
of the groups the same. 
 
Any approach to polarization based on a pair of the group inequality concepts we have 
defined will capture certain judgments about social situations and neglect others. Only by 
combining all three concepts can an approach to polarization which takes account of the 
considerations reflected in each of the concepts be constructed.  
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A variant of group inequality comparison (I) has been proposed as a stand-alone measure 
of polarization (Kanbur and Zhang, 2001). However, such a measure, while attractive in 
its simplicity can violate some intuitions. Consider Figure 10 in which two completely 
segregated and clustered groups A and B experience within-group progressive transfers 
which reduce within-group inequality. Further suppose that they also experience a 
reduction of between-group inequality through progressive transfers between the 
members of the two groups in such a way that the ratio of between-group inequality to 
overall inequality remain unchanged and the groups ( whose densities are now depicted 
by A’ and B’) overlap. If we utilize group inequality comparison (I) alone as our measure 
of polarization, a social configuration with A and B is viewed as being exactly as 
polarized as a situation with A’ and B’, which seems to conflict with our intuitions. If we, 
however, combine it with some measure of sequence inequality and /or representational 
inequality (both of which are lower when the groups overlap), the first situation is 
unambiguously more polarized than the second.    
 
It should be noted that the regressive transfers considered above led to a decrease in the 
index of group inequality comparison (I) and therefore their impact was in the opposite 
direction from that which would normally be expected of an inequality measure ( i.e. to 
obey the Pigou-Dalton principle of responding to a regressive transfer with an increase in 
measured inequality).   It follows that any measure of polarization which increases when 
the index of group inequality comparison (I) increases would similarly potentially violate 
the Pigou-Dalton principle9.   
   
  




Our purpose in this section is to formalize the concepts relating to group differences 
which we have introduced above and develop measures of them10.   
 
We begin by supposing a `social configuration’ (ζ ) in which there is a population, S0, of 
individuals {i} of size N partitioned11 into K distinct identity groups (S1, S2....SK). The 
individuals possess an attribute (let us say y), drawn from an attribute set, Y.  The 
                                                 
9 This view corresponds to the findings of Esteban and Ray (1994) among others that polarization and 
inequality are distinct concepts and that measures of polarization need not therefore be expected to obey the 
Pigou-Dalton principle. 
10 These measures can be readily implemented using a Stata module that we have developed and which will 
be made publicly available in due course. 
11 We do not consider currently the case of societies in which individuals belong to more than one identity 
group simultaneously and in which the identity groups do not form a partition of the society into mutually 
exclusive categories. Generally, a partition of a society can be constructed on the basis of the Cartesian 
product of the identity groups in the society. This solution may not be deemed appropriate, however, in 
every situation. For example, a mixed race group in a society otherwise divided into two races may be 
deemed to belong to both of the races rather than to neither, and it may be thought that this characterization 
is relevant to our judgments regarding inter-group differences.   
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attributes are not necessarily ordered.  For example, the attribute may be a level of 
income (ordered and cardinally measured), a quality of health (ordered but not cardinally 
measured) or a club to which a person may belong (distinguished from one another, but 
not ordered).  We employ a superscript to distinguish the information associated with 
distinct social configurations. For simplicity, we assume (although nothing depends on 
this other than notation) that the number of elements, l, in the set Y, is finite.     
 
More specifically, the individuals {i} each belong to a distinct identity group 
0   ( 0)JS S J⊆ ≠  so that  
 
0i S∀ ∈ , Ji S∈  for some J, with 
 
 







=∪ .   
We assume that there are at least two identity groups which are each smaller than the 
population as a whole and non-empty.  Let the number of persons in group J be denoted 





θ =  for[ (0,.. )]J K∈ . 
 
Each individual i has attribute iy .  The same attribute may be shared by more than one 
individual.   
 
Define the membership function for group J by: { }( ) # |J J iM y i S y y= ∈ = , for [ (0,.. )]J K∈ . 
Moreover define the complementary membership function for group J by 




A simple way to capture the degree to which each identity group is disproportionately 
represented among those who share a given attribute would be to describe the ratio of the 
proportion of the persons possessing a given attribute who belong to each group, J, to 







M y θ ). This information is fruitfully captured in 
what we call the representational inequality Lorenz curve (Figure 11). The RI Lorenz 
curve relates the cumulative population proportion of a given identity group SJ to the 
cumulative proportion of all others, when the proportions of those possessing a given 
attribute belonging to the identity group are ordered from lowest to highest. As we shall 
see, this framework allows for a simple way of presenting information concerning these 
proportions and for analyzing this information using familiar tools12. 
                                                 
12 In spirit, this approach is similar to that adopted by Duncan and Duncan (1955) and later, inter alia, by 
Silber (1989, 1991), and Hutchens (1991, 2004).  Silber notes that various information structures (for 
example involving the frequencies with which distinct groups possess an attribute such as membership in 
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In order to construct the RI Lorenz Curve for each group, J, we first create a rank 
ordering, RJ, such that  
 
1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ... ( )J J JJ J J lM y M y M y≤ ≤  . 
 
Clearly, if the attribute is ordered then the values ˆ( )
J
J iM y will not in general be ordered 
in the same way as the attribute at which they are attained.  The attribute ˆ
Ji
y is assigned 
an index, i purely according to the rank of ˆ( )
J
J iM y at that attribute. 
 






























where [ (0,.. )]t l∈ and 
(0) 0 and (0) 0J Jα β≡ ≡ . 
 
We can now define the RI Lorenz Curve for group J, lJL , as follows: 
 
When ( )Jx tα= , for integer values[ (0,.. )]t l∈ then l( ) ( )J JL x tβ= and, when x is such that 
1( ) ( )J Jt x tα α +< < , ( 1)t l≤ − , then 
 
l l l( ) ( ( )) ( ( 1))(1 )J J J J JL x L t L tα λ α λ= + + − where ( ))






−= + − . 
 
In this definition, we follow the usual procedure (described, for example, by Shorrocks 
(1983), p.5). 
 
This gives rise to a curve as in Figure 11 below. By construction, the RI Lorenz curve 
must, in the familiar way, begin at (0,0) and end at (1,1), as well as  slope upwards, with 
the slope increasing as one moves to the right, since each addition to the total cumulative 
population of others is associated with an addition of a larger proportion of group J.  Note 
that the 45 degree line here has the interpretation of being the line of equiproportionate 
representation (analogous to the line of perfect equality in the case of an ordinary Lorenz 
curve). That is, all along this line, the members of identity group J are represented at 
every attribute in the same proportion as they are represented in the population as a 
whole.  
  
Any deviation from the line of equiproportionality represents a situation in which 
members of the group are disproportionately represented’ in the possession of certain 
attributes, leading them to be ‘over-represented’ in the possession of certain attributes 
                                                                                                                                                 
an occupation) can be analyzed using ‘measures of dissimilarity’ which are analogous to measures of 
inequality. Our approach builds upon this insight but differs from all of the authors above in explicitly 
going beyond the two-group case, and aggregating information derived from the concentration curves of 
different groups. 
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and ‘under-represented’ in the possession of others.  The RI-Lorenz curve   therefore 
contains information on the extent of segregation of a population in relation to the 
attributes possessed.  Having defined it, we can draw on the analogy between the RI-
Lorenz curve and the ordinary Lorenz curve to suggest further useful concepts. 
 
Consider for instance what might correspond to the familiar idea of a progressive 
transfer. Just as a progressive transfer in an income distribution involves a transfer from a 
person with higher income to a person with lower income, in the context of 
representational inequality a progressive transfer could be defined as a transfer of a 
person from the set of persons who possess an attribute in which his or her identity group 
is represented more to one in which it is represented less. However, since we are dealing 
with proportions of identity groups possessing different attributes, a transfer of a single 
person will change the overall population that possesses each attribute involved, affecting 
the ‘denominator’ used to assess population proportions for the groups possessing these 
attributes. We overcome this problem and maintain an unchanged denominator by instead 
employing the concept of a ‘balanced bilateral population transfer’13: 
 
Definition: Balanced Bilateral Population Transfers 
 
Suppose ( , )i jy y Y∃ ∈  and SP, SQ such that   
 
( ) ( )P i P jM y M y>  and ( ) ( )Q i Q jM y M y<  
 
with P≠Q and i ≠j. 
 
Then a progressive (regressive) balanced bilateral population transfer is one in which 
population mass Δ  (i.e. some number of persons; we abstract from integer problems here) 
of group P is shifted from yi to yj and equal population mass Δ  of group Q is shifted from 
yj to yi, thereby lowering (raising) ( )P iM y  and ( )Q jM y  while raising (lowering) 
( )P jM y and ( )Q iM y . 
 
A balanced bilateral progressive population transfer results in two upward shifts in the RI 
Lorenz curves for the identity groups (and corresponding downward shifts for regressive 
transfers).  An example of the latter is provided in Figures 12a and 12b. The RI Lorenz 
curve that results from a progressive (regressive) balanced population transfer dominates 
(is dominated by) the RI Lorenz Curve that preceded the transfer.14 We note further that: 
 
Lemma 1: There exists a pair of identity groups and a pair of attributes (yi,yj) for which a 
progressive balanced bilateral population transfer can take place if all groups are not 
equi-proportionately represented in the possession of every attribute.  
 
                                                 
13 This concept of a balanced bilateral population transfer is related to that of a ‘disequalizing movement’ 
between groups used by Hutchens (2004) in his discussion of a two group case.  However, the latter 
concept is insufficient in a multi-group case and necessitates the use of the alternative concept which we 
develop and employ. 
14 For the relevant reasoning, see Shorrocks (1983). 
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Proof: See Appendix Three 
 
An RI Lorenz curve ( )L x  weakly dominates an RI Lorenz curve l'( )L x  if and only if 
 ( ) '( )L x L x≥  for all [0,1]x ∈ . An implication of this framework is that any Lorenz 
consistent measure of inequality, for which inequality never decreases when ( )L x  is 
replaced by L(x), i.e. all income inequality measures used in practice, can also be applied 
to measure representational inequality.  It is also well known in the literature on income 
distribution that it is possible to shift from an income distribution that possesses a Lorenz 
curve ( )L x to another that possesses the Lorenz curve '( )L x where ( ) '( )L x L x≤ if and only 
if there exists a corresponding sequence of progressive transfers.  Equivalently, in our 
case, it is possible to shift from a situation for which each group possesses a Lorenz 
curve ( )JL x to another in which each group possesses a Lorenz curve 
'( )JL x where ( ) '( )J JL x L x≤  if and only if there exists a corresponding sequence of 
balanced bilateral progressive population transfers.  For this reason a balanced bilateral 
progressive population transfer can be deemed to decrease overall representational 
inequality.  
 
The consequence is a striking parallel between inequality measures in the income space 
and inequality measures in the representation space. Table (I) provides a map of the 
isomorphism between corresponding concepts introduced so far.15 
                                                 
15 The concepts of the generalized Lorenz curve and dominance of generalized Lorenz curves do not 
possess straightforward and interpretatively useful analogs in the area of representational inequality since 





Correspondences between Conventional Inequality and Representational Inequality 
Concepts 
 
Conventional Inequality Concept Representational Inequality Concept 
  
Inequality Over or Under Representation 
Pigou-Dalton Transfers Balanced Bilateral Population Transfers 
(First order) Lorenz Dominance (First order) RI Lorenz Dominance 
 
 
Suppose that we apply Lorenz-consistent inequality measure ˆ ˆ( ( )JI L x to assess 
representational inequality for group J and denote the resulting vector of measured 
inequality for all groups in the society by Iˆ and its individual components by 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( ))J JI I L x= , (1,.. )J K∈ . Then, an overall measure of representational inequality in the 
society is given by  ˆ( ,...)RI f I=  where (0) 0, (1) 1,  and 0 for all (1,.. )
Jˆ
ff f J K
I
∂= = ≥ ∈
∂
.  
One simple version of such an aggregation function, f, is the mean of the group-specific 
representational inequality measures. It may seem attractive for a measure of overall 
representational inequality to take into account subgroup sizes and respond to unequally 
sized groups differently. Indeed, it will be argued below that there can be sound reason 
for such weighting. We may define a population weighted overall representational 












= ∑      
 
where Jθ  refers to the population weight of  subgroup J. 
 
Such a measure can be offered some justification through axiomatic underpinnings which 
we consider in the next section. 
 
Any empirical application of the concept of segregation, and thus of representational 
inequality, requires by its very nature the partitioning of the attribute space in some way.  
Representational inequality concerns the extent to which particular attributes (whether 
income levels, occupations, or locations of residence) are shared by members of different 
groups. It is evident that this determination will depend on how these attributes are 
defined. For example, in an analysis of residential racial segregation in a city, defining 
the neighborhood of residence in the broadest way (to encompass the entire city) will lead 
to the conclusion that there is no racial segregation at all, since all races are represented 
in the same way that they are represented in the city as a whole.  At the opposite extreme, 
defining the neighborhood of residence to be the individual household may lead to the 
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conclusion that there is almost complete racial segregation if individuals in households 
are overwhelmingly from a single race.  The appropriate way to define the neighborhood 
will lie between these extremes and will depend on the form in which data are available 
as well as the interests and purposes of the researcher.  The fact that judgments as to the 
appropriate ‘bin size’ are needed in empirical work is not therefore a detriment, and 
rather is intrinsic to the exercise.16 
 
 
   
Sequence Inequality 
 
As noted in the discussion of the previous section, representational inequality is a 
measure of group differences which is indifferent to the ordering of attributes as well as 
to their cardinal properties. To operationalize our concept of sequence inequality 
therefore, we now assume that the attributes can be ordered.  
 
Considering first the concept of group rank dominance, we define a pair-wise individual 
rank domination function, ijδ , for a given pair of individuals i  and j  as follows: 
 0 if and 1 if ij i j ij i jy y y yδ δ ≥= < = .  We can now define the group rank domination 
quotient for group J as follows: ( )
( )
ij
i K j J K
J
J Jn N n
δ
τ ∈ ∈ ≠= −
∑ ∑
. It can be seen that Jτ possesses the 
interpretation of the proportion of possible instances of pair-wise domination involving 
members of group J and members of other groups in which such domination actually 
occurs.  It is evident that this quotient varies between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 
1 for any group.  The size of the group plays no direct role in determining the value of the 
group rank domination quotient. Rather it is the placement of members of the group 
relative to members of other groups that determines the quotient. Sequence inequality 
could be treated simply as the measured inequality in Jτ  across groups.  It is common for 
individuals from a given group to express pride or shame at the achievements or failures 
of other members from that group. Such a psychological interpretation can provide 
justification for treating the group rank domination quotient as defining the experience of 
each individual in that group and measure inequality across all individuals in possession 
of that experience17. 
 
A seemingly puzzling asymmetry is implied by our approach to sequence inequality. 
Consider two populations, consisting of one white individual and ten black individuals 
each. In the first population, the individuals are ordered in the income space from lowest 
to highest as (w, b, b, b,....b), and in the second, the individuals are ordered from lowest 
                                                 
16 It is possible to conceive of several different ways of determining bin size. For instance, bin size may be 
fixed in absolute terms (e.g. in terms of some number of dollars or years lived), fixed in proportional terms 
(e.g. as one percent of the highest possible income) or fixed in relation to the size distribution of the 
attributes (e.g. at the income thresholds corresponding to successive deciles of the population). 
17 One way to interpret sequence inequalities is in terms of an analogy to a society wherein each group 
practices radical egalitarianism.   In such a society, an even distribution of each group’s share of the social 
assets, in this case instances of rank domination, results among the individuals belonging to the group. 
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to highest as (b, b, b, b.....w). In the first instance, all 10 black members possess a 
domination quotient of 1, while the white individual possesses a domination quotient of 
zero. The inequality in domination quotient is therefore inequality in a population having 
scores (0, 1,1,1,1....1). In the second case all 10 black members possess a domination 
quotient of 0, while the white individual possesses a domination quotient of 1. The 
inequality in domination quotients is therefore the inequality in a population having 
scores (0,0,0,0,0....1). It is clear that more sequence inequality will be recorded in the first 
case than in the second, even though all that has been done is to change the placement of 
the white from being at the bottom to being at the top of the income spectrum.  While this 
may initially appear puzzling, it is perhaps appropriate to treat these cases 
asymmetrically. By the psychological interpretation, in the first instance most people in 
society do not experience a relative deprivation. By contrast, in the second, most do.   
 
 
As we noted above, the average rank of a group (call it Jω , (1,.. )J K∈ ) is also an 
indicator of group rank sequence position. In fact, it is linked in a direct and monotonic 
fashion to group rank dominance.  It is easily shown that the relation between them, for a 
perfectly segregated population is :  
 





ωτ − += −  
 
In the case of populations which are not perfectly segregated, appropriate changes to the 
definition of a rank maintains this relationship (see Appendix Two): 
 
The inequality in group rank sequence position across groups can be assessed either in 
terms of the inequality of group rank dominance quotients or that of average group 
ranks.18 In either case, if a member of a group (the ‘beneficiary’) exchanges his or her 
attribute with another person in a different group who has a higher level of the attribute, 
then the indicator of group rank sequence position is increased for the group to which the 
beneficiary belongs and is decreased for the other group.  We assume henceforth in this 
section that we are specializing to the case of group rank dominance quotients, although 
the concepts we present can equally be applied to average ranks. 
 
The group rank dominance quotients achieved by members of distinct groups can be 
captured by what we call the group rank dominance (GRD) Lorenz curve. The GRD 
Lorenz curve relates the cumulative proportion of the total of the group rank domination 
quotients to the cumulative population of groups, when the identity groups are ordered 
from lowest group rank domination quotient to highest.  It captures the degree of 
inequality in group rank domination quotients.  Any symmetric arrangement of identity 
groups in the attribute space (i.e. one in which for any instance in which a member of a 
given group rank dominates a member of another group, a distinct pair can be found in 
                                                 
18 For a given group, although the ordinal ranking of social configurations according to the group’s rank 
sequence position does not depend on the choice between these indicators (or indeed any other monotonic 
transformation thereof) the cardinal level of the indicator does depend on it.  As a result, the choice of 
indicator can be consequential for determining the measured sequence inequality 
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which the opposite is true) is one of perfect equality in group rank domination quotients, 
and will give rise to a GRD Lorenz curve which is on the forty five degree line. 
 
We can now define coordinates of the GRD Lorenz curve associated with each group 




























where [ (0,.. )]t K∈ and (0) 0 and (0) 0α β≡ ≡ . 
 
We can now define the GRD Lorenz curve as a whole, nGRDL , as follows: 
 
When ( )x tα= , for integer values[ (0,.. )]t K∈ then n( ) ( )GRDL x tβ= and, when x is such 
that ( ) ( 1)t x tα α< < + , ( 1)t K≤ − , then 
 
n n n( ) ( ( )) ( ( 1))(1 )GRD GRD GRDL x L t L tα λ α λ= + + − where ( ))




−= + − . 
 
An example of such a curve is shown in Figure 13.  Since the Lorenz curve is defined for 
sequence inequality analogously to income inequality, with income corresponding to the 
group rank domination quotient of the groups to which individuals belong, the properties 
of the GRD Lorenz curve are analogous to those of the ordinary Lorenz curves. Once 
again, therefore, any Lorenz consistent measure of inequality will suffice to capture the 
level of sequence inequality. 
 
Group Inequality Comparison 
 
Group Inequality Comparison (I) refers to the degree to which between-group 
inequalities contribute to overall inequality. Typically, measures which are “additively 
separable” (such as members of the generalized entropy class) have been utilized for this 
purpose (see e.g. Shorrocks, 1980, Foster and Shneyerov (1999) and Zhang and Kanbur 
(2001)), although such a restriction is not required. In particular, if the between-group 
inequality is defined as the inequality that arises when every member of the population is 
assigned a  representative level of attribute (mean, generalized mean, median or other 
measure of central tendency) of the group to which they belong, then the ratio of 
between-group inequality to total interpersonal inequality can serve as an index of Group 
Inequality Comparison (I). This measure has the advantage of always lying between zero 
and one and responding in an appropriate way to intra-group transfers.  More generally, 
any indicator that the distributions associated with different groups are different can 





Polarization as we have defined it above aggregates the three concepts concerning group 
differences which we have defined. The range of polarization measures which could be 
used is very wide indeed since any such measure could involve any form of aggregation 
of a three-tuple (RI, SI, GIC), and in turn each element of this three-tuple could be 
defined in various ways. Further, any measure of polarization which is positively 
responsive to all three will only be maximized in a situation where all three are 
maximized.  
 
An empirical examination which involves these four concepts can, as we have noted, be 
achieved through the use of almost any commonly used measure of inequality. The 
choice of measure will naturally bring in additional implications and properties. Given 
this flexibility, an analyst can choose which measure to utilize in order to satisfy the 
additional properties he or she thinks important. Thus, for example a researcher who 
wishes to treat sequence inequality as being decreased more in a situation where an 
exchange of ranks happens between members of different groups, each of whom has 
lower ranks to begin with, can choose an inequality measure which shows the required 
form of transfer sensitivity (e.g. a generalized entropy index with appropriately chosen 
parameters).  Whether the measure of polarization can be normalized in a specific way 
will also depend on the choice of the underlying measures of inequality. 
 
 
Part III: Axiomatic Framework 
 
We define below some requirements that may reasonably be imposed on measures of 
each of the concepts defined above, considering each of them in turn. We also identify 
some classes of measures which satisfy these requirements.   
 
 
Axioms (Representational Inequality): 
 
We begin by suggesting some requirements which may be imposed on an overall 
representational inequality measure RI when it is viewed as a function of the information 
in a social configuration ζ.   We write RI=RI(ζ) to reflect this dependence. 
 
Axiom (RI1): Lorenz Consistency 
 
Let (ζ1, ζ2) refer to two different social configurations and (I,J) refer to two 
different identity groups. If (ζ1, ζ2)  are such that 1ˆIL ≥  2ˆIL ,  1ˆJL ≥  2ˆJL , and 
1 2
, ˆ ˆ , , (1,.. )H HL L H I J H K= ∀ ≠ ∈  then RI(ζ1) ≤  RI( ζ2). 
 
In other words, all else remaining equal, a social configuration which is at least as 
segregated according to the criterion of Lorenz dominance of representational inequality 
Lorenz curves is one which is at least as representational unequal. It may be noted that 
just as there is an equivalence between Lorenz consistency of an inequality measure and 
that measure’s respect for the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, there is an equivalence 
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between Lorenz consistency of a representational inequality measure as defined here and 
the requirement that the representational inequality measure respond to a progressive 
balanced bilateral transfer by registering a decrease. 
 
 
Axiom (RI2): Within Group Anonymity 
 
If  ijy represents the attribute of person i ( (1,.. ))Ji n∈  belonging to group J 
( ( (1,.. ))J K∈ and  
if (ζ1, ζ2)  are such that 1 2 ( )JiJ i Jy yπ=  ( )i∀ where Jπ  is a permutation operator 
applied to (1,... ))Jn then RI(ζ1)=RI(ζ2). 
 
In other words, a  measure of overall representational inequality is invariant to 
permutations of the attributes assigned to individuals within an identity group.  
 
 
Axiom (RI3): Group Identity Anonymity 
 
If  ijy represents the attribute of person i ( (1,.. ))Ji n∈  belonging to group J 
( ( (1,.. ))J K∈ and if (ζ1, ζ2) are such that 1 2 ( )iJ i Jy y π= and 1 2 ( )J i Jn n π= , ( )i∀ ,where 
π  is a permutation operator applied to (1,... )K then RI(ζ1)=RI(ζ2). 
 
In other words, a  measure of overall representational inequality is invariant to 
permutations of the group identities with which distinct sets of individual attributes are 
associated.  This axiom incorporates the idea that all of the information relevant to 
assessing representational inequality is taken into account by noting the partition of the 
society into groups and the attributes of the members of these groups.  The axiom 
embodies the idea that there is no need to take independent account of any other features 
of groups.  This approach disallows the incorporation of judgments that group identities 
are additionally relevant (e.g. by reason of past histories or present injustices not already 
reflected in the information described by the social configuration)19.   
 
Axiom (RI4): Minimal Representational Inequality 
 
Let ˆEL  be the RI Lorenz curve corresponding to even representation (i.e. the line 
of equiproportionate representation). If ˆ ˆJ EL L=  (1,.. )J K∀ ∈  then RI = 0. 
 
In other words, minimal overall representational inequality is achieved when all identity 
groups are represented in the same proportion as their share of the population for all 
attributes, and has measure zero.  
 
                                                 
19 See Loury, (2004) for an extensive discussion on the merits of the anonymity axiom as applied to groups. 
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Axiom (RI5): Maximal Representational Inequality 
 
The maximum level of Representational Inequality is 1. 
 
This is a normalization axiom which may be imposed for interpretative convenience.  It 
may be dispensed with if it is desired to employ an unbounded inequality measure (such 
as a measure of the additively decomposable generalized entropy class). 
 
 
Axiom (RI6): Positive Population Share Responsiveness of Overall Representational 
Inequality 
 
Suppose that a measure of overall representational inequality is a function of the vector of 
measures of representational inequality of groups, Iˆ . Suppose further that the population 
share for group J is increased and that for group H is decreased, and the set of measures 
of representational inequality of groups remains unchanged as do the population shares 
for any remaining groups.  Suppose further that ˆ ˆJ HI I> , i.e. that the group-specific 
representational inequality of group J is greater than that of group H. Then the measure of 
overall representational inequality must increase. 
 
This axiom can be motivated in different ways.  We might for example believe that a 
group which is very small in the population  but which is highly unequally represented 
simply because it is a small group in a society where there is unequal representation 
should not affect overall representational inequality in the same manner as a group which 
is much larger.   
 
We may note that the measure of overall representational inequality defined above, 
( )( )
1








= ∑ , satisfies these axioms as long as the measure used to assess 
representational inequality for each group, Iˆ  , is Lorenz consistent, which will be the 
case if it has the form of any standard inequality measure, for example the Gini 
coefficient.  
From another perspective, it may not be appropriate disproportionately to disvalue the 
unequal representation of smaller groups. If one is interested in the experience of groups 
as opposed to the experience of individuals within groups, it should make no difference 
whether the group is small or large. Following this intuition, there is no reason to 
promote a population weighted overall measure and one should instead adopt a measure 
which weights every group equally. This alternative may seem especially compelling if 
one views polarization as an attribute of the society as opposed to the individuals who 
belong to it. Such a measure can satisfy all the other axioms. 
 
 
Axioms (Sequence Inequality): 
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In what follows we shall use Jγ to refer to the indicator of group rank sequence position 
(which may be either the group rank domination quotient or the average rank) of group J. 
Let SI refer to the measure of overall sequence inequality.  Some reasonable axioms are 
as follows: 
 
Axiom (SI1): Lorenz Consistency 
 
Let (ζ1, ζ2) refer to two different social configurations and (I,J) refer to two 
different identity groups. Further, let Lˆ  refers to the Lorenz curve describing 
inequality across groups in the indicator of group rank sequence position, Jγ . If 
(ζ1, ζ2)  are such that 1ˆL ≥ 2Lˆ , then SI(ζ1) ≤  SI( ζ2). 
 
 
Axiom (SI2): Within Group Anonymity 
 
If  ijy represents the attribute of person i ( (1,.. ))Ji n∈  belonging to group J 
( ( (1,.. ))J K∈ and  
if (ζ1, ζ2)  are such that 1 2 ( )JiJ i Jy yπ=  ( )i∀ where Jπ  is a permutation operator 
applied to (1,... ))Jn then SI(ζ1)=SI(ζ2).  
 
Axiom (SI3): Group Identity Anonymity 
 
If  ijy represents the attribute of person i ( (1,.. ))Ji n∈  belonging to group J 
( ( (1,.. ))J K∈ and if (ζ1, ζ2) are such that 1 2 ( )iJ i Jy y π= and 1 2 ( )J i Jn n π= , ( )i∀ ,where 
π  is a permutation operator applied to (1,... )K then SI(ζ1)=SI(ζ2). 
 
Axiom (SI4): Sequence Inequality Limits 
 
Let ˆEL  be the Lorenz curve (describing inequality in the indicator of group rank 
sequence position, Jγ ) that corresponds to even group rank sequence position (i.e. 
the case in which Jγ is the same for all groups). If ˆ ˆEL L=   then SI = 0. 
 
 
Axiom (SI5): Maximal Sequence Inequality 
 
The maximum level of sequence inequality is 1. As with Axiom RI5 above, this is a 
normalization axiom which may be imposed for interpretative convenience.  It may be 
dispensed with if it is desired to employ an unbounded inequality measure (such as a 





Axioms (Group Inequality Comparison): 
 
Some reasonable axioms may be as follows, assuming that members of each group, j  , 
are assigned a representative income, jμ , and also possesses an individual income, ijy .  
 
 
Axiom (GIC1): Between Group Synthetic Population Lorenz Consistency 
 
Let (ζ1, ζ2) refer to two different social configurations. Assume that a synthetic 
population is constituted in which every member of a group, j  , is assigned the 
same representative income for its group, jμ .  Consider the Lorenz curve, 1 2,L L  , 
for the resulting synthetic population in each social configuration. If (ζ1, ζ2)  are 
such that 1 2L L≥   and 1 2L L= (i.e. the overall Lorenz curves for the actual 
population remain unchanged) then GIC(ζ1) ≤ GIC(ζ2) . 
 
This axiom states that between-group regressive transfers which do not change the 
overall interpersonal distribution must have an appropriate directional effect (non-
decreasing) on the measure of GIC.   Thus, for example, an exchange of incomes between 
individuals of different incomes belonging to two different groups that results in an 
increase in inequality in the synthetic population must increase the measure of GIC.  
 
 
Axiom (GIC2): Within Group Anonymity 
 
If  ijy represents the attribute of person i ( (1,.. ))Ji n∈  belonging to group J 
( ( (1,.. ))J K∈ and  
if (ζ1, ζ2)  are such that 1 2 ( )JiJ i Jy yπ=  ( )i∀ where Jπ  is a permutation operator 
applied to (1,... ))Jn then GIC(ζ1)=GIC(ζ2).  
 
Axiom (GIC3): Group Identity Anonymity 
 
If  ijy represents the attribute of person i ( (1,.. ))Ji n∈  belonging to group J 
( ( (1,.. ))J K∈ and if (ζ1, ζ2) are such that 1 2 ( )iJ i Jy y π= and 1 2( )J Jn nπ= , ( , )i J∀ , 
where π  is a permutation operator applied to (1,... )K then GIC(ζ1)=GIC(ζ2). 
 
Axiom (GIC4): Within Group Lorenz Consistency 
 
Let (ζ1, ζ2) refer to two different social configurations.  Further, let 1ˆiL  and 2ˆiL refer 
to the Lorenz curves describing inequality within each group, i , in the respective 
social configurations. If (ζ1, ζ2)  are such that 1ˆiL ≥ 2ˆiL , but 1 2i iμ μ= then 
GIC((ζ1) ≥ GIC((ζ2) . 
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This axiom states that within-group (weakly) regressive transfers of income must have an 
appropriate directional effect (non-increasing) on the measure of GIC, holding the 
representative incomes of groups constant. Clearly, since Group Inequality Comparison 
(II) does not rely on any information about within group inequality, imposing this axiom 
will exclude its use. 
 
It may be readily checked that a measure of GIC of the form B/T, where B represents the 
inequality measure for the synthetic population in which each member of the society is 
assigned the representative income of its group and T represents the total interpersonal 
inequality of the society, satisfies all of the axioms above. Such a measure would capture 
the concept of Group Inequality Comparison (I).  In contrast, employing B alone as the 
measure of GIC would capture the concept of Group Inequality Comparison (II). Such a 





We have proposed above to define polarization as a function of the other concepts of 
group difference we have defined. In this section we assume that the attribute of concern 
is cardinally measurable so that all three concepts have a role to play. Without loss of 
generality, we shall assume that the attribute is income.  However, it would be sufficient 
to assume that the attribute was ordinally measurable in which case polarization can be 
conceived as a function of RI and SI alone, with appropriate amendments to the axioms 
presented below. Adopting this approach to the construction of a polarization measure, 
we specify a few possible desiderata for such a measure, as follows.  These may be 
selectively drawn upon and combined as desired. 
 
Axiom (P1): Arguments of the Polarization Function 
 
Polarization is a function of RI, SI, and GIC and of these arguments alone.   
 
Axiom (P2): Zero Product Rule   
 
If ζ is such that RI=0 or SI=0 or GIC =0 then P(ζ) =0 
 
In other words, if there is no representational inequality in society or there is no sequence 
inequality or the index of group inequality comparison is zero then there is zero 
polarization. The rationale for this axiom is discussed more extensively below. 
 
Axiom (P3): Conjoint Effects on Polarization  
 
If (ζ) is such that RI=1 and SI=1 then P(ζ ) =GIC 
If (ζ) is such that SI=1 and GIC=1 then P(ζ ) =RI 
If (ζ) is such that RI=1 and GIC=1 then P(ζ ) =SI 
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In other words, if any two of the measures have reached their maximum values then the 
degree of polarization of the society is determined by the third measure and is equal to it.  
This axiom may be applied if the underlying inequality measures used to calculate RI and 
SI are respectively bounded but not otherwise. 
 
Axiom (P4):  Maximal Polarization is one and Minimum Polarization is zero. 
 
This is a normalization axiom imposed for interpretative convenience. It may be applied 
if the underlying inequality measures used to calculate RI and SI are respectively 
bounded but not otherwise. 
   
Axiom (P5):  Positive Responsiveness of Polarization to its Arguments  
 
If (.ζ1, ζ2) is such that (RI1, SI1, GIC1) >(RI2, SI2, GIC2 ) then P(ζ1) >P(ζ2)  
 
In other words, if any argument of the polarization function is increased without changing 
other arguments of the polarization function, then polarization increases.   
 
Given these axioms, we can specify an appealingly simple example of a polarization 
measure which satisfies Axioms (P1)-(P5), where the inequality measure used to 
calculate RI and SI is any which is bounded and normalized to vary between zero and 
one: 
 
     ( )( )( )P RI SI GIC=  
 
This is not the only measure that satisfies the axioms above although it is an attractive 
one. However, it can be shown that it is the unique measure which satisfies the axioms 
above and additional ones. For example, it is the only measure which satisfies axioms P1, 
P3, P4 and P5 and is of the CES functional form (as shown in Appendix Four). This 
highly specific result is surprising since the CES functional form is very flexible indeed, 
and accommodates a wide range of judgments concerning the tradeoffs that are 
appropriate to make between the different components of a measure.  The requirement 
that RI and SI are bounded and normalized to vary between zero and one excludes certain 
inequality measures, such as the additively decomposable members of the generalized 
entropy class.   
 
It is interesting to note that the simple polarization measure above also satisfies additional 
axioms which may be imposed, such as 
 
Axiom (P6):  Conjoint Responsiveness of Polarization to its Arguments  
 









In other words, the impact of an increase in any argument of the polarization measure is 
greater when any other argument of the polarization function is higher (if remaining 
arguments are unchanged).  The merits of such an axiom are open to discussion. 
 
In the case in which the attribute of interest is cardinally measurable, the following axiom 
is also satisfied by the polarization measure (and indeed, mutatis mutandis, by RI, SI and 
GIC individually): 
 
Axiom (P7): Scale Invariance 
 
If two social configurations (ζ1, ζ2)  are such that 
1 2  i (1,... ) and i iy ky N k R
+= ∀ ∈ ∈ and the social configurations are otherwise 
identical then P(ζ1)=P(ζ2). 
 
In the case where the attribute is only ordinally measurable, P may be defined simply as  
( )( )P RI SI=  and can be supported by a similar set of axioms. 
 
We have required above that polarization takes a value of zero when any one of its 
arguments is zero. If representational inequality is zero, this means that at every attribute 
level, individuals from all groups are represented in exactly the same proportion as they 
are represented in the population as a whole. As such it is difficult to characterize such a 
configuration as possessing any polarization. Equally, when group rank sequence position 
is zero, this means that the distribution of members is perfectly symmetric (i.e. every 
instance of domination by a member of a group vis-à-vis a member of another group is 
balanced by a reciprocal instance of domination by a member of the other group vis-à-vis 
a member of the first group. Once again, while there may be inequality in the society, it 
would be hard to characterize this situation as one in which there is any polarization 
between groups. Finally in the accustomed approach to assessing group inequality 
comparison, if the means of all groups coincide then this contribution is zero, and 
polarization is equal to zero.  
 
When is polarization maximized? RI is maximized when there is complete segregation of 
groups in the achievement space. Assuming this condition is satisfied, what additional 
conditions are required to maximize SI?  It is easily seen that the maximum value of SI is 
approached in the limit in which the social configuration is such that one group is as large 
as possible relative to all others and is disadvantaged relative to all others (specifically in 
the sense that every member of the disadvantaged group possesses lower achievements 
than every member of every other group).   Assuming this condition too is satisfied, what 
additional conditions are required to maximize GIC?   If the concept of GIC employed is 
of Type I then the within-group inequalities in the population must be as small as 
possible. This will be attained when there are no intra-group differences in achievements.  
Any distribution which satisfies these properties will suffice to approach the maximum 
level of polarization (for example, that shown in Figure 14a, which depicts three groups 
with differing population sizes and achievement levels).   
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If the concept of GIC employed is of Type II then the maximum value of GIC is 
approached in the limit in which the relatively disadvantaged group possesses the lowest 
possible level of the achievement and the members of other groups possess levels of the 
achievement which are as high as possible compatible with complete segregation.   Thus, 
if there are two groups one of them must possess the lowest level of the achievement (e.g. 
zero income) and the other must possess the highest level of the achievement (e.g. all of 
the income, evenly divided among its members). If there are more than two groups, all 
groups other than the most disadvantaged must possess distinct achievement levels which 
are as close as possible to the attainable maximum. Any distribution which satisfies these 
properties will suffice to approach the maximum possible level of polarization (for 
example, that shown in Figure 14b, which depicts three groups with differing population 
sizes and achievement levels in a feasible range).   
 
The conclusion as to the circumstance in which polarization is maximized differs from 
that reached by others.  As opposed to Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004), for example, in 
which polarization is maximized only when there are two equal sized groups, in our 
analysis it can be maximized regardless of the number of groups and it is necessary that 
the most disadvantaged group is as large as possible relative to the others.  For 
polarization to approach its maximum it is required that the poorer group is large relative 




Part IV: Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to clarify how one may assess social situations according to the 
extent to which attributes are disproportionately possessed by different social groups.  
The measures we have developed capture the various different ways in which experiences 
of members of distinct groups may differ. Thus, social situations can differ in the extent 
to which members of a group share experiences with members of other groups 
(representational inequality), experience the same or different relative positions 
(sequence inequality) and experience differences in the extent to which interpersonal 
inequalities are accounted for by inter-group differences (group inequality comparison). 
These concepts are distinct but complexly interrelated. They each integrate empirical 
observations and evaluative judgments. Judgments concerning the relative importance to 
be attached to different aspects of inter-group difference are also involved when they are 
combined (for example to form a measure of polarization).20 These measures have an 
intuitive appeal and can have widespread application in social science.  
 
There appear to deep-seated tendencies for societies to exhibit segregation, clustering and 
polarization of identity groups. This observation has important empirical implications and 
may also give rise to normative concern. For either reason, the concepts and measures we 
have discussed may prove useful.  
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Figure 11: The Representational Inequality Lorenz Curve
























Figure 12a: Balanced Bilateral Transfer
































Figure 12 b: Balanced Bilateral Transfer
































Figure 13:  The Rank Dominance Lorenz Curve



























































Appendix One: Moral Reasoning and Inter-Group Differences 
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Should inter-group differences be disvalued? We have argued above that there are both 
intrinsic and instrumental reasons that might be appealed to in answering this question.  
The instrumental reasons need not depend on any direct concern with the relative well-
being of groups since they can be purely derivative of a concern for individual advantage 
(insofar as such advantages are causally affected, through various mechanisms, by their 
distribution across the different groups in society to which individuals belong).  The 
moral justification for such concern is consequently dependent only on there being moral 
reason to favor a particular distribution of individual advantages with regard to which 
inter-group differences play a causal role. 
 
In contrast, the perspective in which inter-group differences are intrinsically disvalued is 
more challenging to justify. This perspective appears to contrast with that advocated in 
standard "individualist" approaches to social assessment, which are embodied in social 
choice theory and in moral philosophy.  For example, the "anonymity axiom" in social 
choice theory is typically interpreted to demand that permutations of individual 
advantages across persons, whatever groups they may each belong to, should not have 
any effect on assessments of the desirability of social states of affairs.  Such an approach 
appears to rule out any direct concern for inter-group differences (on which, see for 
example Loury, 2004).   
 
A thought experiment may be helpful in investigating the appropriate role that group 
related considerations should play in social assessment.  We may imagine an "original 
position" of the general type described by Rawls (1971) or other theorists in the modern 
contractarian tradition of moral philosophy.  Imagine that the parties to this original 
position (perhaps trustees choosing alternative social arrangements on behalf of specific 
individuals who will ultimately inhabit them, along the lines defined by Rawls (2001)) 
engage in bargaining with each other about future social arrangements in one of two 
different situations.   
 
In the first situation, the trustees know only that the individual who they represent will 
eventually occupy a particular position in a well-defined distribution of individual 
advantages, where that distribution depends on the particular choice of social 
arrangements made by the trustees and where a particular position in society is assigned 
to each individual  through a "lottery".  In the second situation, the trustees know that the 
individual that they represent will be assigned to a particular rank in a specific social 
group in a "first round lottery", and that each social group will be assigned to occupy a 
particular set of positions in a social distribution of advantages in a "second round 
lottery"21.   
 
Suppose that the expected final distribution of individual advantages (disregarding group 
membership) is expected to be identical in the two situations, given a specific choice of 
social arrangements by the trustees.  Suppose further that the second situation is such that 
as a result of the second round lottery systematic differences in the possession of 
individual advantages between members of distinct groups are expected to result.  No 
                                                 
21 We abstract from the issue of relative sizes of groups here. 
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such systematic differences would normally be expected to result from the lottery 
implemented in the first situation. By construction, the outcomes resulting from the social 
arrangements put in place in the first situation will be ones in which there are no 
systematic inter-group differences of the kind that are present in the outcomes resulting 
from the second situation, although the distribution of individual advantages is identical.  
Should any moral distinction be made between these two cases?   
 
It seems clear that the parties to the original position would have no reason to prefer one 
situation over the other if they are concerned only about the individual advantages that 
are distributed, since the individuals who they represent have an identical chance in either 
case of occupying any given position.  If there is reason to prefer the first situation over 
the second it must have to do either with the concern that systematic inter-group 
differences are likely over time to have causal effects which merit moral attention which 
have not otherwise been considered (for example by leading to internalized stigma or 
other psychological effects on individuals, or the entrenchment over generations of social 
inequalities between groups) or with a view that group membership is a morally salient 
feature to be taken account of in the assessment of the distribution of individual 
advantages quite apart from its effect on individual lives. An attempt to justify the latter 
perspective might employ a conception in which such non-individualistic considerations 
play a role (on which see e.g. Parfit, 1997, on “telic” and “deontic” approaches to the 
assessment of inequality).   
 
Of course, the device of the original position may only have partial relevance to the moral 
assessment of actual empirical cases.  In practice, distributions of individual advantage 
derive from historical processes, some of which may have involved systematic and 
perhaps grievous harm done by members of a given group toward members of another 
group.  In such a case, considerations of historical reparation and other moral concerns 
related to the rectification of historical injustice may play a role in the justification of 
moral concern for inter-group differences. 
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Appendix Two (Rank Domination Quotient and Average Rank) 
 
As we noted above, the average rank of a group (call it Jω , (1,.. )J K∈ ) is also an 
indicator of group rank sequence position. In fact, it is linked in a direct and monotonic 
fashion to group rank dominance.  As before, we understand rank as referring to the 
position in which an individual appears when incomes are sequenced from lowest to 
highest (the ascending order of values). When individuals from the same group share an 
income we shall assign them a rank equal to the average position in which an individual 
appears when incomes are sequenced from lowest to highest. We shall consider 
subsequently the rule to be applied in assigning ranks when individuals from different 
groups share an income. 
 
Consider at the outset, for simplicity, a perfectly segregated population in which there is 
no more than one individual in each income bracket. In such a population, the total 
number of instances of pair-wise rank domination that members of group J enjoy vis-à-
vis others can be understood as a function of the ranks of members of group J in the 
population. The lowest ranked member of group J, having rank r1 dominates (r1-1) 
persons belonging to other groups.  The second lowest ranked member of group J, having 
rank r2 dominates (r2-2) persons belonging to other groups (i.e. (r2-1) persons belonging 
to all groups -1 person belonging to the same group)). Extending this logic, the total 






























from which it follows that:  
 





ωτ − += − . 
 
It is easy to see that this formula also applies in the case in which there may be more than 
one person in an income bracket but all persons who share an income bracket are always 
from the same group. In contrast, in the most general case of populations in which there 
may exist some income brackets which contain members of distinct groups there can be 
ties in the income ranks assigned to members of different groups, which will imply that 
this formula will no longer hold exactly unless the ranks are assigned appropriately to 
individuals in the same income bracket. Specifically, if strict domination is the concept 
that is employed then this relationship will hold exactly if individuals in the same income 
bracket are assigned a rank equal to the lowest of their positions in the ascending order of 
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values. Correspondingly, if weak domination is the concept that is employed then this 
relationship will hold exactly if each individual in the income bracket is assigned a value 
equal to the sum of the lowest of the positions of the individuals sharing the income 
bracket (in the ascending order of values) and the number of individuals from other 
groups with whom they share the income bracket. 
 
The correspondence we have derived between Jτ and Jω holds also in the case of 
continuous distributions, as can be shown through limit properties. In this case, the 
average rank of members of a group, J, is defined by 
 
( ) ( )JJ N F x g x dxω = ∫  
 
and the rank domination quotient for the group is defined by: 
 
  ( ( ) ( ))J J JF x g x dxτ θ= −∫  
 
Where ( )F x is the cumulative distribution function for incomes of the entire 
population, ( )Jg x is the density function for incomes of members of the group, J, and the 
integrals are calculated over the domain of all possible incomes. 
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Appendix Three (Proof of Lemma 1) 
 
Without loss of generality, we shall assume that the attributes can be understood as 
income levels. Let A refer to a matrix of size K by n with K identity groups and n income 
levels.  Each element in the matrix {0,1,2}, ( , )ija i j∈ ∀ . We say that the ith identity group 
is ‘under-represented’ at the jth income level if the proportion of persons from group i at 
income j is less than the proportion of persons of group i in the population as a whole.  
We denote the statement that the ith identity group is ‘under-represented’ at the jth 
income level by 0ija = . We say further that that the ith identity group is ‘over-
represented’ if the proportion of persons from group i at income j is greater than the 
proportion of persons of group i in the population as a whole.  We denote the statement 
that the ith identity group is ‘over-represented’ at the jth income level by 1ija = . If the ith 
identity group is represented at the jth income level in the same proportion as it is 
represented in the population as a whole then we say that it is “equiproportionally 
represented” and we denote this by 2ija = . 
 
Thus A is a matrix in which every element is 0,1 or 2.  We may further note that if any 
row or any column contains a zero then it must contain a one and vice versa. This 
requirement captures the necessity that if an identity group is overrepresented at an 
income level, it must be underrepresented at another income level and that if a group is 
overrepresented at an income level then another group is under-represented at that same 
income level.  
 
A balanced bilateral transfer is always possible if an identity group is represented to a 
greater extent at one income level (call it y1) than it is at another (call it y2) and another 
identity group is represented to a lesser extent at y1 than it is at y2.  This condition is 
satisfied as long as it is possible to identify two rows (i and j) and two columns (l and m) 





⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ which is of one of the 
following forms, or which can be constructed from one of the following forms by 




⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,
2 0
0 2
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,
1 2
2 1
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,
1 0
2 1
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,
0 2
1 0





The lemma is therefore equivalent to the statement that there exists a matrix A~ for any 
matrix A which contains at least a single one or zero.  Suppose that the lemma is false. 
Then, it is possible to construct an A such that there is no A~ associated with it. 
 
We now try to construct such a matrix A. Without loss of generality consider the case in 
which A contains at least one zero (i.e. an identity group is under-represented at a 
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particular level of income). We can present this as occurring at the top left corner (a11)of 















This however means that there must be at least one level of income in the first column 
and in the first row in which there is over-representation of an identity group. Without 
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Consider row 2 and column 2 now. Since for the already fixed elements, there is over-
representation, there must be elements in row 2 and in column 2 respectively that have 
value zero (reflecting under-representation). Without loss of generality, let these occur at 
















⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠#
  
 
But this in turn fixes a13, a31 and a33 to be 0 since if  any of these are 1 or 2, we can 
construct matrix A~ . This in turn implies that there exist elements elsewhere in row 3 and 
column 3 with value 1 (indicating over-representation), which we can place without loss 
of generality at a34 and a43, respectively.  It can readily be seen that this in turn fixes a41, 
a42 , a44,  a24 and a14  to be 1 since if  any of these are 0 or 2, we can construct matrix A~ . 
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Thus we may construct a matrix A such that aij= aji =0 if i is odd and j i≤  and aij=1 
otherwise.  
 







1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0





⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠





" " " "
 
 
This in turn implies that ak-1,n =1 and ak,n-1 =1. It may be verified that for A~   not to exist 
all elements in row k and in column n must equal 1. However, this violates the 
requirements on a matrix A. 
 






0 0 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1





⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠





" " " "
 
 
This in turn implies that ak-1,n =0 and ak,n-1 =0. It may be verified that for A~  not to exist 
all elements in row k and in column n must equal 0. However, this violates the 
requirements on a matrix A. 
 
Thus it is not possible to construct a matrix A such that A~ does not exist. 
 







Appendix Four:  The Multiplicative Polarization Function in the CES Family 
 
Proposition: The only Polarization function which satisfies Axioms P1, P3, P4, and P5 
and belongs to the CES family of functions is the multiplicative form ( )( )( )P RI SI GIC= , 
where RI and SI are calculated using an inequality measure which has a range between 
zero and one 
 
Proof: By Axiom P1 it is a function of all three arguments and only those. Since the 
Polarization measure is a member of the CES family it can be taken to have one of the 
forms: 
 
i. ( ) 11 2 3CESP RI SI GICβ β β βα α α= + +  with β > 0. 
 
ii. 1 2 3( )CESP A RI SI GICα α α=  
 
iii. 1 2 3min( , , )CESP A RI SI GICα α α=  
 
 
It is easy to check that functions of form (i) fail Axiom P3, and functions of form (iii) fail 
Axiom P5. What about functions of form (ii)? By Axiom P4 , the coefficient A must have 
value 1 and  by Axiom P3, the exponents must also have value 1. Thus, form (ii) 
collapses to the pure multiplicative form ( )( )( )P RI SI GIC= . It may be checked that this 





It may be noted that if Axiom P3 is dropped then the function 1/3(( )( )( ))CESP RI SI GIC=  
is admissible. This may be attractive from the viewpoint that the values of the 
polarization index which are produced are in of the same order of magnitude as the 
component parts of the index.  If Axiom P3 is dropped then functions of form (i) cannot 
be excluded.   However, if it is required that Axiom P2 be satisfied then functions of 
form (i) can be excluded.    It follows that functions of the form 1 2 3CESP RI SI GICα α α= are 
the only members of the CES family which satisfy Axioms P1, P2, P4, and P5, where RI 
and SI are calculated using an inequality measure which has a range between zero and 
one. 
 
If Axiom P3 is dropped and additionally Axiom P4 is adjusted so that there is no 
requirement that the index of polarization take on a maximum value then a broader range 
of inequality measures can be used to calculate RI and SI, such as the additively 
decomposable generalized entropy measures (which are unbounded above).   
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